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This paper focuses on the growth and convergence of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern 
European EU countries (CESEE). We argue that the factors behind the pre-crisis growth model 
of the region – skilled yet affordable labour force, foreign direct investment, imports of 
productivity-enhancing technology – are petering out, and are yet to be substituted. We 
propose a new growth model centred around a shift towards more home-grown innovation, 
digitalisation, climate change mitigation and a strong focus on skills, labour and social inclusion 
to leave the middle income trap behind for good and to boost economies’ growth prospects in 
a post-COVID world. Based on analysis of firm-level data, we highlight the prerequisites of 
making this transition happen. 
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• To continue the process of economic convergence and to maintain competitiveness, 
CESEE countries need to revisit their growth models and move towards a more 
innovation and knowledge-based framework. 
• A new growth model for the region needs to focus on  
1) home-grown innovation,  
2) digitalisation,  
3) strengthening the skill base and social inclusion,  as well as  
4) fostering the transition towards a greener economy.  
• The COVID-19 shock amplifies the structural challenges CESEE economies are facing. 
The experience of the lockdowns demonstrated the critical importance of digitalisation 
for competitiveness and economic resilience. While the pandemic shock offers a “make-
or-break” moment for the climate transition, it could widen inequalities and societal fault 
lines in the region. 
• Home-grown innovation needs to gradually take over the role of technology import in 
CESEE, yet most countries in the region are still regarded as modest or moderate 
innovators compared to their EU peers. Limited availability of finance and people with 
the right skillsets are holding back innovative firms. To overcome bottlenecks, it is 
necessary to nurture the available skilled labour force and to increase the access to 
finance, in particular risk capital and venture debt. 
• Digitalisation is an opportunity for CESEE and its firms. Businesses can access distant 
markets easier, and benefit from cost reduction or product and process improvements 
through digital technologies. While most countries in the region still need to catch up 
with the rest of the continent on digitalisation, many firms in CESEE are on par with EU 
peers in adopting certain key digital technologies. Digitalisation , however, may lead to 
polarisation, could adversely impact the labour market and  could deepen inequalities 
in the region through job automation. We argue that to leverage on digitalisation it is 
necessary to strengthen the skill base to advance the digitalisation transformation in the 
region, and to mitigate at the same time individuals’ risks of being left behind. 
• Despite progress in the area, the countries of the region continue to be more energy 
intensive than the rest of the EU. They could achieve further significant carbon reduction 
through lowering the energy use of the building stock, through renewable electricity 
generation and through the greening of transport systems. Strong policy action is 
necessary to drive the transition itself, but also to mitigate of the possible adverse social 
impacts of the low carbon transformation. 
• Addressing skill shortages by investment in human capital is a key element of a 
successful transition to the new growth model. Skill shortages remain a major bottleneck 
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for long-term growth. Countries of the region need to step up efforts to boost adult 
learning. They also need to apply a wide range of active labour market policies to 






Economies in Central Eastern and South Eastern Europe have come a long way on the 
convergence path despite some setbacks. Until the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, 
economies of Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe (CESEE)1 established a record of 
significant growth and economic progress. The process leading to the EU accession, and the 
accession itself, have unleashed the inherent potential of these economies. Previously state-
owned industries were privatised and important reforms were implemented, which laid the 
foundations of market economy. This in turn attracted capital and foreign direct investment that 
drove productivity improvements and GDP growth. In many instances, however, unsustainable 
levels of consumption and borrowing propelled to some extent the pre-crisis growth, thus 
exacerbating the recession following the 2008 crisis. 
To continue the process of economic convergence and maintain competitiveness, CESEE 
countries need to revisit their economic models and move towards a more innovation and 
knowledge-based convergence framework. The “old CESEE growth model” underpinning post-
accession convergence has been based on the combination of low labour costs, the role of 
exports, and the capital inflows intermediated through foreign direct investments. While the 
regions’ economies recovered successfully from the downturn following the financial crisis, we 
argue that the growth model has reached its limits, which has manifested in the slowdown of 
productivity growth, increased labour costs, and significantly lower capital inflows. As the old 
model appears to be less and less capable to propel the engine of economic convergence, it 
raises the question of what mechanism could replace it as a driver of the catching-up process. 
While the need for a new growth model clearly predates the most recent pandemic shock, we 
contend that the impact of COVID-19 reinforces the case for this transition.2  
To avoid getting stuck in the middle income trap and achieve sustainable growth in the years 
to come countries in the region need to focus on i) innovation ii) digital technologies, iii) climate 
change mitigation and iv) skills, labour and social inclusion. Together, these four areas form the 
                                               
1 In the context of this paper, CESEE refers to the eleven EU member States in Central Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Czechia, Estonia, Lithuania, Croatia, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia, and Bulgaria), i.e. 
we consider the three waves of enlargement (2004: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia, 2007: Bulgaria and Romania and 2013: Croatia).The only exception is aggregate data from the 
EIB CESEE Bank Lending Survey, which uses a somewhat different definition (see EIB 2018a).  
2 We use the term “growth model” in this report in a practical sense to describe the way a given economy and its 
economic policy rely on the economies’ resources and factors of production – capital, labour, technological progress 
– to achieve economic growth, as opposed to describe a theoretical economic model seeking to identify the drivers 
of long-term economic growth.   
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basis for sustainable growth looking ahead. However, the region still faces substantial catch-up 
needs in each of the four areas.  
In the coming years, home-grown innovation needs to gradually take over the role of 
technology import in CESEE. So far, technology importation has not been substituted with 
home-grown innovation. Most countries in the CESEE region are still regarded as modest or 
moderate innovators compared to their EU peers. The transformation of innovation investment 
into scientific and technological outputs has improved, but some important bottlenecks – e.g. 
availability of staff with the right skill set – remain. Firm-level data points towards strong 
discrepancies within the CESEE region, but also shows some encouraging signs, such as a 
growing share of corporate investment being dedicated to innovation. To strengthen innovative 
firms in the region, it is necessary to increase the availability and access to finance, such as risk 
capital and venture debt products.  
Digitalisation presents an opportunity for the region. In general, most countries in the region 
still need to catch up to leading EU peers on digitalisation. While digitalisation has different 
dimensions, including the availability of digital infrastructure, skillsets and the adoption of 
technologies by households, the public sector and corporates,  firm-level data from the EIB 
Investment Survey (EIBIS) shows that on the last point, i.e. the adoption of several key digital 
technologies3, corporates in  the region are on par with EU peers. Some countries have even 
become leaders in some of the other dimensions, e.g. digitalisation of public administration, or 
developed successful digital hubs. However, challenges related to digitalisation pertain to risks 
for polarisation, a potential adverse impact on labour markets and a deepening of inequalities 
in the region. We present new evidence showing that risks of job automation are particularly 
high in CESEE regions compared to other parts of the EU. Moreover, firm-level data suggests 
that the limited availability of skilled labour risks propelling labour saving rather than labour 
augmenting digitalisation investment. We argue that skill shortages in the region also reflect 
structural reasons and hence need to be addressed with a long-term perspective, looking 
beyond cyclical fluctuations in labour demand. Hence, a key area for action to fully leverage 
digitalisation are measures to strengthen the skill base, helping to advance the digital 
transformation in the region and maximising its benefits while mitigating potential negative 
effects. 
Addressing skill shortages through investment in human capital is a key element of CESEE 
economies’ successful transition to the new growth model. Evidence shows that many CESEE 
firms have been facing difficulties in finding personnel over the last years, with innovative 
companies and those catching up to the productivity frontier being particularly affected. At the 
same time, CESEE labour markets face relatively high risks related to automation and job cuts 
liked to the reduction of carbon-intensive economic activities. Countries of the region need to 
                                               
3 Key digital technologies refer to 3-D printing, advanced robotics, Internet of Things, Cognitive Technologies, 
Augmented Reality or VR, drones and platforms.  
6 
step up efforts to boost adult learning, and apply a wide range of active labour market policies 
to address the additional strains put on the labour market and facilitate job transitions for 
workers. Prompt action is needed to support reskilling and upskilling activities to avoid 
outcomes where significant parts of the populations become excluded from the gains of the 
progress. 
Europe is in the process of taking a bold action in terms of global leadership in the fight for 
climate change and the CESEE region can make a significant contribution boosting prospects 
for success. The economic transformation of the CESEE region was accompanied by large-scale 
gains in energy efficiency over the past three decades but the countries of the region continue 
to be more energy intensive than the rest of the EU. Key areas where significant progress can 
still be achieved include the energy use of the building stock, renewable electricity generation 
and the greening of transport systems. 
The COVID-19 pandemic is amplifying the structural challenges that the CESEE economies are 
facing. For instance, it clearly demonstrated the critical importance of digitalisation for 
competitiveness and highlighted the risks of lagging behind. As to the labour market and skills, 
COVID further widened the gap between the “old” and the “new” world of work, emphasising 
the already existing regional and societal fault lines of inequality. When it comes to climate 
change mitigation, the pandemic offers a “make-or-break” moment for the fight climate 
change. If CESEE countries miss that, they risk fully reverting to the pre-pandemic standards and 
locking them in for longer. Following on swift policy responses, forward-looking strategies for 
recovery are needed. Recovery strategies should focus on the four elements of the new growth 
model – innovation, digitalisation, the green transition and a focus on human capital - to 
support a forceful and sustainable economic rebound. 
In the followings, we outline the key parts of a new growth model for the region and connect 
them in a coherent framework. Using firm-level data from EIBIS, complemented with aggregate 
statistics, we assess countries’ positioning concerning the key pillars of the new growth model. 
We discuss the challenges and opportunities for transitioning towards the new growth model 
against the background of the most recent developments and the impact of the global COVID-




The old growth model has been petering out 
 
Exports, propelled by low wages, capital inflows and technology import, were major growth 
drivers in CESEE before 2008. Integration through trade well preceded the actual EU accession. 
Geographical proximity, reforms and competitiveness helped to integrate quickly into the EU 
supply chains (particularly into the one of the German automotive manufacturing sector), 
granting indirect access to global markets (see Hagemejer and Muck, 2019). This ushered in an 
era of export-driven growth, particularly of machinery and transport equipment manufacturing. 
Over time, the CESEE countries have moved up somewhat the production value chain, with 
more and more complex technological processes adopted by the local subsidiaries of the 
multinational companies (Roaf et al, 2014). 
The combination of low wages and a skilled labour force were catalysed by the EU membership, 
which contributed significantly to the export-led growth. At the same time, EU membership 
brought down the legal barriers and other cross-border frictions, giving CESEE a strong 
advantage over other geographical regions with similar characteristics. Together with the 
availability of specific skillsets in the region, including command of Western European foreign 
languages, and geographic proximity, CESEE countries became a particularly attractive 
nearshoring destination.4  
Private investment - to a large extent in the form of foreign direct investment - flourished in 
most CESEE countries, also supporting productivity. Economic and political transition, 
privatisation, the prospect of EU accession, and financial deepening fuelled investment. Large-
scale private greenfield investments helped build up and modernise the capital stock in the 
countries of the region, and facilitated rapid export growth.  Foreign direct investment had a 
beneficial impact on capital deepening. Moreover, it enabled transfer of technology and know-
how, thereby supporting the rapid increase of total factor productivity (Damijan et al., 2013). 
The pre-crisis growth model came hand-in-hand with imbalances. In some of the countries, 
these manifested in increased external deficits and international indebtedness.5 Initially capital 
inflows took the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). These inflows typically financed 
productive assets, and reflected long-term commitments from the investors’ side. However, 
growth was largely driven by external borrowing for consumption and real estate, and became 
increasingly unsustainable in the years before the financial crisis. 
                                               
4 Campos et al (2014) provide an estimate on the positive effects of EU membership on aggregate income levels.  
5 Current account deficits to GDP ratios reached double-digit GDP levels in Bulgaria, the Baltic States and Romania 
in the years before the crisis, and elevated to high single digit levels in other countries of the CESEE region, with the 
exception of the Czech Republic.   
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The financial crisis prompted a protracted reversal of the strong capital inflows leading to a 
recession in the region. The lack of new funding triggered declines in credit and domestic 
demand. The output slowdown in the euro area, and deleveraging by Western European parent 
banks exacerbated and prolonged the sudden stop, and weighed heavily on macroeconomic 
and financial developments (Gattini et al, 2019). 
Despite a robust recovery in CESEE, potential growth slowed down significantly during the 
financial crisis and its aftermath. Furthermore, the slowdown of potential growth was not 
particular to a single factor of production. While the decline of total factor productivity (TFP) 
was the largest, other factors – capital and labour also contribute negatively to the post-2009 
decline in potential growth. While the latest estimates of potential growth approached the pre-
crisis levels by 2019 (see Székely and Buti, 2019), the upside is more limited by factor constraints 
than 15 years ago.  
While European structural and investment funds (ESIF) have played a crucial role supporting 
public investment, private investment remained subdued. EU funds helped maintaining a 
healthy level of public sector capital formation during the post-crisis downturn. Private 
investment, however, declined sharply and still has not fully recovered to the level experienced 
in the early 2000s. Low private investment is partially related to the slowdown of capital inflows. 
With the advent of the financial crisis, capital flows to the region, both gross and net, collapsed 
and have remained at a low level. The largest decline came from inward FDI, which dropped to 
a third by the 2012-2014 period relative to 2005-2007 (EIB, 2016). This decline contributed 
significantly to lower corporate investment, both directly and indirectly via the catalytic effect of 
FDI on domestic investment that weakened with this decline.  
The pace of technological change has also slowed down with the moderation of inward FDI, 
reflected in lower total factor productivity growth. Lower TFP growth is partially due to the fact 
that it has become more difficult to find those ‘low hanging fruits’, where the replacement of 
old, outdated technology to modern production facilities led to large-one off productivity 
improvements. The extra productivity gains for any additional FDI are lower now than they used 
to be around the time of the enlargement. In addition, exogenous factors, such as the crisis and 
the related shift in risk perceptions, contributed to the slowdown of FDI and lower TFP growth 
as a result.  
The labour force has become a key constraint to investment and growth over the last years. 
Hitherto an untapped potential, labour markets in CESEE countries have increasingly tightened, 
to the extent that labour shortage became a drag on investment and competitiveness. The post 
financial-crisis rise in unemployment reversed, and countries of the region have come close to 
full employment. Wage growth has surpassed productivity increases in some countries of the 
region (EIB 2018, 2019). Skill shortages have been particularly pronounced and persistent 
compared to other regions of the EU, posing issues for many firms in the region (see EIB 2018, 
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2019). Compared to the rest of the EU, more CESEE firms posted open positions with vacancies 
for higher-skilled occupations often hard to fill (EIB 2018).6  
Financing constitutes another challenge, particularly for innovative firms. In the region, 
innovative companies appear particularly prone to being financially constrained (Correia et al, 
2018, Pál and Wruuck, 2019). CESEE firms’ financing remains largely bank centric. Funding for 
venture and growth capital is coming mainly from outside CESEE, and from public sources. 
Venture capital volumes in the CESEE have been stagnating in the last few years. Venture capital 
accounts only for 6% of total private equity volume, with 70% of the recipients being start-ups. 
The ICT sector accounts for almost half of the venture capital volume in the CESEE.7 The VC 
market in the region is characterised by the prevalence of public resources.   
The petering out of the old growth model may cast the shadow of the middle-income trap over 
the countries of the region in a worst-case scenario. Despite the cyclical upturn over the last 
years, growth has still lagged behind the levels seen in those countries that successfully 
graduated from middle income to high income. Furthermore, many of the other conditions of 
a successful continuation of the convergence towards the most developed economies of Europe 
– for instance, high levels of private investment – are not present either.  
The problem of reaching and maintaining a level of economic development that corresponds 
to high income is not unique to CESEE. The Spence report (Commission on Growth and 
Development, 2008) presents a broad set of empirically established conditions that can be 
considered as prerequisites of successfully graduating from the middle-income trap.8 They 
derive these from the experience of 13 countries, mostly from the Far East. He highlights the 
role of high investment levels, in particular to infrastructure, human capital development, early 
childhood and higher education and healthcare, among others.9 Eichengreen et al (2014) point 
out that convergence slowdowns are more likely to occur in middle income economies 
characterised by high old age dependency, excessive investments into projects with low future 
returns, and undervalued exchange rates that remove the incentives to innovate. In contrast, 
countries investing into high quality human capital and shifting their exports towards higher 
tech products are better positioned to avoid the middle-income trap.  
                                               
6 See EIB 2018 for further discussion. 
7 However, there are some recent signs that the VC market situation in the region is improving. The recent investment 
and divestment activity confirms the positive trends of the previous years, despite the significant influence of a limited 
number of large transactions. 
8 We refer to the ‘middle income trap’ as a slow-down in growth when a country approaches upper/middle income 
levels.  
9 The EU membership have been helping the countries of CESEE towards meeting these conditions, both directly 
through providing access to  various forms of investment support (ESIF, EIB, EFSI), and indirectly through the four 
freedoms provided by the single market. 
10 
There is extensive evidence about the presence of various symptoms of the middle income trap 
in the CESEE context. For instance, EBRD (2017) demonstrate growth underperformance relative 
to other emerging regions, slowdown of productivity growth, gaps in the capital stock in the 
EBRD region, including CESEE. When it comes to investment, Bubbico et al (2017) show that 
levels of investment, by the private sector in particular, appear to be below the level necessary 
for economic convergence towards the core of the EU and current investment levels are not 




What could be the characteristics of a new growth model? 
 
CESEE countries need a new growth model to propel growth and convergence looking ahead.  
In the light of the constellation, risks of being stuck in the middle income trap and the constraints 
described above, what could drive growth in the region?10 We propose the following themes as 
key integral parts of a new growth model for the countries of the region: 
1. Domestic innovation as a key driver of productivity growth, 
2. Investment in digitalisation, 
3. Sustainable development towards a carbon-neutral economy. 
4. Preservation and improvement of skills and human capital. 
Figure 1: Elements of a new growth model for CESEE 
 
Source: EIB Economics Department 
We revisit the state of play of the foundations of these four pillars in CESEE, focusing mainly on 
the private sector. Using firm-level data from EIBIS, we assess countries’ positioning about the 
key pillars of the new growth model. We discuss the challenges and opportunities for 
transitioning towards the new growth model against the background of the most recent 
developments and the impact of the global COVID-19 pandemic on the region. 
  
                                               
10 For further discussion in the literature about the need for a new growth model and its possible elements also see 











Sustainable long-term convergence needs to be based on innovation. Countries that are far 
behind the technological frontier are often able to show rapid progress based solely on capital 
accumulation, labour force growth and technology import for a while. However, after a certain 
level of technological sophistication sustainable long-term convergence can only be achieved 
by becoming innovative and creating, rather than importing, technology. Countries that are 
unable to go through this transformation risk being stuck in the middle-income trap. 
Home-grown innovation needs to gradually take over the role of technology import in CESEE. 
It is clear that in many countries of the region there are still opportunities to move upstream in 
the functional specialisation in manufacturing (Stöllinger, 2019), and these economies – 
especially Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia – technology adoption will remain an important source 
of productivity growth. Nevertheless, CESEE economies have reached a level of development 
where more domestic innovation is increasingly needed to maintain the momentum of 
economic growth.11 
So far, technology importation has not been fully substituted with home-grown innovation in 
CESEE. Figure 2 illustrates the strong association between investment in knowledge and 
innovation – in the form of intangible assets, such as research, development, software, data, 
training or business process improvements – and the level of economic development. It also 
reveals that CESEE economies as a group are lagging behind the rest of the EU. Nevertheless, 
substantial heterogeneity exist in the evolution of innovation performance across the CESEE 
region. Some countries – such as Lithuania, Slovakia and Latvia – have increased their innovation 
capacities, while in others – including Slovenia, Croatia and Bulgaria – innovation performance 
has stagnated. 12 
                                               
11 See Acemoglu et al (2006) on the changing trade-off between imitation and innovation-based productivity growth 
relative to the distance to the global technological frontier, and its impact on on-term growth and convergence. 
12 The crucial role of innovation in the future convergence of CESEE countries is discussed in detail by Correia et al 
(2018). 
13 
Figure 2: Correlation between GDP per capita and share (%) of intangible investment in total corporate 
investment, 2017 
  
 Source: EIB Investment Survey, Eurostat 
Currently, most countries in the CESEE region are still regarded as modest or moderate 
innovators. The European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) summarises innovation performance 
across EU Member States and ranks them once per year.13 Most of the CESEE countries fall 
under the categories of “Moderate innovators” (Czechia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Croatia), or “Modest innovators” (Bulgaria and Romania).14 The gap 
between the most and the least advanced innovators does not seem to be closing, with regional 
innovation performance in Bulgaria and Romania increasing more slowly than for all EU 
regions.15 At the regional level, the innovation gap is also significant. Based on the Smart 
Regions Index (Kollár, Bubbico, and Arsalides, 2018), the CESEE regions and cities lag behind 
their EU peers (see Figure 4). Manufacturing firms and large companies primarily drive 
innovation activity in CESEE countries. Looking at firms with active R&D spending, i.e. leading, 
incremental and developing innovators), about 64% of active innovators are large firms, almost 
18% are medium-size firms and less than 14% are among small firms (Figure 4 and Figure 5). 
                                               
13 See http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/facts-figures/scoreboards_en 
14 See European Innovation Scoreboard 2020 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_20_1150) 
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Figure 3: Smart regions (EU rankings and within CESEE rankings, NUTS 3 regions) 
  
 Source: Kollár, Bubbico, Arsalides (2018) 
 
The transformation of innovation investment into scientific and technological outputs has 
improved, but some bottlenecks remain. Part of the challenge of further improving firms’ 
innovation performance in the region is to achieve broad-based improvements in innovation 
systems. Moreover, constraints imposed by the labour market situation pose a particular 
bottleneck as firms’ readiness to innovate is closely linked to the availability of staff with the 
right skillsets.  
Evidence points towards strong discrepancies within the CESEE region but also shows some 
encouraging signs. The EIBIS data from the 2020 survey indicates strong differences for 
Figure 4: CESEE - Active innovators by firm size, 2020  Figure 5: CESEE - Active innovators by sector, 2020 
  
Source: EIB Investment Survey, 2020  
Note: Active innovators refer to those that spend actively on R&D and fall into the categories of leading 
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innovation activity within the region. While nearly two in five firms (39%) report having 
introduced some new products or services, this share varies between almost half of firms 
reporting some innovation activity in Poland and  Lithuania (47%, and 44% respectively) to a 
low of some 32% in Romania,  30% in Estonia and 28% in Bulgaria. However, survey results 
continue to suggest that most innovation activity still pertains to adoption. Analysing 
developments over a five year period (2016-2020) indicates that an increasing share of 
corporate investment has been dedicated to innovation in CESEE and a larger share of firms 
prioritises the development of new products and services as with regards to their future 
investment (around 25% for 2016-2018 and up to 30% in 2020). Overall, firms in the region 
attach even slightly greater importance to innovation than EU peers (28% on average). Hence, 
survey results point to persistent (perceived) ‘catch-up’ needs but also a shift in firms’ mind-sets 
attaching greater priority to innovation. Similarly, analysis of intra-European knowledge flows 
using citations data over a longer time period indicates that while Western and Europe has 
remained the leading region in terms of citation linkages within the EU, integration of Central 
and Eastern Europe into knowledge flows have increased compared to 2001. However, 
collaboration intensity16 with other EU countries, a factor correlated with the share of 
productivity leaders in an economy, still remains low across CESEE economies (EIB 2019). 
CESEE economies need to continue strengthening different types of innovation activities for 
convergence. The key challenge remains to reduce the share of firms neither actively advancing 
nor adopting innovation. This supports rising productivity on average as well as mitigating gaps 
across firms. Innovative firms in Central and Eastern Europe tend to experience a number of 
obstacles in their operating environment, such as business regulation, skill shortages and access 
to finance. Here, tackling obstacles in the business environment also serves to support 
innovation as the ability to use and create knowledge and new technologies is shaped by the 
functioning of product, labour and financial markets and the human capital. Dedicated 
innovation policies and instrument mixes need to be tailored to specific country circumstances, 
given strengths and weaknesses and differences in current innovation performance. However, 
two areas policy across the region need to focus on to advance the transition towards a 
knowledge economy are strengthening of the skill base through investment in education 
systems and life-long learning opportunities and supporting access to finance. Furthermore, 
beyond a focus on mitigating current deficits in innovation systems, a forward-looking focus on 
strengthening digital innovation presents an opportunity for CESEE economies, as legacy 
technology issues can be less pronounced and some have quite high quality digital 
infrastructure (see Table 1). 
Part of the innovation gap is related to finance, or the lack of it. The heavily bank-based system 
of financial intermediation of the CESEE economies is not conducive of financing innovative 
                                               
16 Collaboration intensity is measured by the number of collaborative patents between country I and the rest of the 
EU. 
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activities (EBCI 2020). The presence of a diverse set of capital providers that are able to finance 
and support innovative firms and their activities with relevant financial instruments across the 
lifecycle is of key to support the innovation process. To strengthen innovative firms in the region, 
and prevent them to relocate after the seed stage, it is necessary to increase the availability and 
access to growth risk capital, particularly at mid-stage (Figure 6). Further development of capital 
markets and alternative funding sources for innovative companies are also of key importance, 
as well as the introduction of new venture debt products targeting later-stage innovative 
companies.  
Figure 6: ESAF equity sub-index by countries 
  
Source: The EIF SME Access to Finance (ESAF) Index, June 2019 update. 
Digital technologies are increasingly becoming innovation drivers. The dynamics and impacts 
of innovation are changing with the rise of digital technologies and their increasing convergence 
with the physical world. Despite cross-country disparities, the CESEE region has made some 
progress towards increasing digital capacity and performance (European Commission 2019, EIB 
2020). Also, in a number of countries, successful technology driven start-ups have started to 
emerge. Twelve “unicorns” with a combined value of EUR 30 bn have been founded across the 
region and several cities across the region are forming start up ecosystems (EIB 2019, Pison 
2020). However, the adoption of digital technologies needs to broaden across firms in order to 
realize productivity gains on a substantial scale and avoid an increasing polarisation among 
































































































































Most countries in the region still need to catch up to EU peers on digitalisation. Digitalisation 
has multiple dimensions including availability of adequate network infrastructure, digital skills 
and use of technologies by corporates and households. On overall digital competitiveness, most 
countries in the region lag behind the EU average with the exception of Estonia and Lithuania 
(see DESI scoreboard 2020). Out of the five dimensions in the Digital Economy and Society 
Index, several CESEE countries in fact score above the European average on connectivity 
infrastructure (see Table 1). However, with the exception of Estonia, all other countries in the 
region lag when it comes to the use of internet services and the development of human capital 
to support digitalisation processes (and arguably the use of Internet services a broad scale). 
Table 1: Digitalisation in CESEE  
 BG HR CZ EE HU LV LT RO SK SI 
Connectivity           
Human Capital           
Use of Internet 
Services 




          
Digital public 
services 
          
Source: European Commission, DESI (2020), EIB ECON. 
Note: Fields marked in green indicate that the country scores above the EU average in the respective 
dimension. 
EIBIS data provides new insights to digitalisation at the firm level and shows some encouraging 
developments. EIBIS provides more detailed information on corporates’ adoption of key recent 
digital technologies (EIB 2020a, EIB2020b). In this respect, the CESEE firms are very similar to 
the EU averages.17 About half of the firms have partially implemented digital technologies and 
12% have organised their business around it. On average, firms in the CESEE region are on par 
and in some countries – Czechia and Slovakia – they are even among the leaders when it comes 
to the adoption of some key digital technologies. At the same time, CESEE also features the 
countries with the lowest share of adopters across the EU (Bulgaria, Poland and Romania). This 
suggests that for some countries such as Romania for instance, where a high share of firms 
                                               
17 The digital technologies considered are 3-D printing, automation via advanced robotics, drones, platform 
technologies, augmented or virtual reality, cognitive technologies and Internet of things. For further information see 
EIB (2019). 
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shows very low productivity in EU comparison, many corporates still miss out on the potential 
productivity gains and risk falling further behind. 
Small firms are slower to adopt key digital technologies. The analysis of firm-level data from 
EIBIS shows discrepancies among corporates across CESEE: About two thirds of large firms in 
CESEE (69%) have at least partially implemented digital technologies compared with some 50% 
of SMEs. Digital adoption gaps between large and small firms are not limited to the region but 
small firms in CESEE arguably face some further challenges for digital adoption. These pertain 
to financing as small firms in the region are not only more often subject to finance constraints 
but operate in an environment with less developed capital markets as well as limited availability 
to attract skilled staff to push ahead with digitalisation processes. In turn, difficulties to attract 
enough specialised talent can slow technology diffusion and development. 
Adoption varies across technology type, with the use of robots having become more 
widespread. Finally, a look at the adoption of specific digital technologies across sectors 
suggests that while the use of IoT and advanced robotics is relatively widespread, CESEE firms 
lag behind EU peers when it comes to the use of cognitive technologies, even though in this 
area the EU has been relatively slow compared to the United States. The widespread use of 
advanced robotics to some extent reflects the industrial specialisation of some countries in the 
region and the use of robots in car manufacturing in particular. At the same time, it also suggests 
that digital technologies in the region are often adopted for labour saving purposes.  
The combination of a favourable business environment and availability of digital talent is the 
basis to broaden adoption and foster digital innovation in the region. The availability of skillsets 
to develop and deploy digital technologies is a key factor that influences firms’ decisions to 
invest in new technologies in general but also affects the purpose, notably whether digital 
technology investment is more labour saving versus more labour augmenting. Here, skill 
constraints also interact with other limiting factors in firms’ operating environment. 
Digitalisation adds to labour market challenges in CESEE as some jobs are being lost and new 
skills need to be learned. Digital technologies set to substantially affect labour markets in the 
region, making some parts of the workforce potentially redundant. CESEE countries have 
relatively high shares of jobs at risk in European comparison given concentrated sectoral 
exposure, tasks and work organisation (Nedelkoska/Quintini 2018; Pouliakas 2018). Our analysis 
of automation risks at regional level corroborates this picture (EIB 2019). The estimates suggest 
that high-risk regions – defined as the 20 % of all EU regions with the highest share of jobs at 
risk of being automated during the next decade – are heavily concentrated in Central and 
Eastern Europe, with seven of the ten most exposed areas are located in Romania. Moreover, 
digitalisation changes skill demand, thereby contributing to shortages firms’ experience. These 
can be particularly pronounced for specialised high-level talent, as there is strong demand for 
these skills globally, and firms in the CESEE region need to compete for skillsets. Indeed, results 
from the EIB special survey on skills and digitalisation found the highest share of long-term 
vacancies for high-level talent in the region.  
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CESEE countries need to strengthen the human capital to support the digital transformation. 
Most CESEE countries lack EU peers with respect to basic internet user skills and advanced digital 
skillsets. Only Estonia exceeds the EU average in both areas. While Croatia, Slovenia and Czechia 
are still relatively close to EU average levels, gaps are larger for Latvia and Poland in both areas. 
Basic user skillsets appear least developed in Romania and Bulgaria. At the same time, both 
countries compare more favourably on advanced digital skillsets, which includes the availability 
of specialist IT talent. Looking at dynamics over the last five years, most CESEE countries, show 
limited improvements on the human capital dimension, again with the notable exception of 
Estonia. 
Figure 7: Basic versus advanced digital skills in EU countries 
 
Source: European Commission, Digital economy and society index.  
Note: The human capital dimension measures ‘basic’ Internet user skills (users with at least basic digital skills, 
above basic skills and basic software skills) and advanced digital skills and development (availability of ICT 
specialists and ICT graduates). The use of Internet services scores are calculated as weighted averages of 
Internet use, online activities and online transactions. For further information on the composition and 
measurement of the index see www.digital –agenda-data.eu/datasets/desi/indicators#desi-dimensions. 
 
Basic digital skills are crucial in determining the overall labour market impact of digitalisation. 
While broader availability of advanced digital talent in some CESEE countries can facilitate the 
development of new digital businesses locally and the growth of digital hubs, the limited 
development of more basic user skills can still hamper these new businesses to thrive in the 
local market (Figure 7). Moreover, the local business environment needs to be receptive and 
favourable to new digital entrepreneurs.  
Constraints in digital skills can skew firms’ investment in digital technologies towards the labour 
saving type. This pattern, with firms more inclined to invest in digital technologies for 
automation purposes rather than to develop new products or services, particularly shows in the 
manufacturing sector (EIB 2020). Facing skill constraints, firms can choose between seeking skills 














































region, firms over the last years have shown stronger reliance on the recruitment channel 
compared to EU peers and less emphasis on training (Figure 8 and Figure 9). Firm size is one of 
the factors affecting training investment. For large firms, EIBIS data shows that, the share of 
corporates in CESEE not investing in training is about the same as in Western Europe (some 
23%). However, small firms are relatively less inclined to invest in training (43% not investing in 
training in CESEE compared to 36% in Western Europe, based on EIBIS 2016-2019). Lower 
training activity together with limited availability to pay competitive wages to attract staff with 
the right skillsets hence remains a factor potentially limiting the spread of digital technologies 
in CESEE and could widen polarisation among firms. 
Figure 8: Strategies to cope with skill gaps in 
current workforce 
Figure 9:  Usual reaction to future skill needs 
  
Source: EIBIS digitalisation and skills survey (2018), CVTS (2015). 
Note: % of all enterprises. Left: Share of firms stating to have taken each measures as a response to skill gaps in 
their current workforce. Right: Share of firms stating to react to future skill needs via recruitment and/or training. 
Policy support for digitalisation in CESEE needs to come with a strong focus on human capital. 
Both broadening basic digital skills as well as expert technology skillsets are needed. The 
emphasis on digital skills helps to advance digital innovation while at the same time helping to 
mitigate risks for people being excluded from a changing labour market. To support the 
availability of digital skills, both education and life-long learning systems in CESEE need to be 
strengthened. The focus on digital skills needs to become “engrained” and the acquisition of 
human-centric skills complementary to technologies (for example creativity, communication) 
needs to be fostered. Increasing the use of digital tools for educational purposes, e.g. in schools 
but also through e-learning opportunities, can be an instrument to broaden the availability of 
digital skillsets. Policies focused on businesses should foster access to early stage funding and 
the creation of accelerators and incubators. Governments also need to work with local 
stakeholders to ensure that the right incentives and supporting tools are available to strengthen 
digital ecosystems.  


























Towards a carbon-neutral economy 
 
The shift towards a carbon-neutral economy comes with challenges, but also with opportunities 
for the CESEE region. Europe is in the process of taking a bold action in terms of global 
leadership in the fight for climate change. To achieve a net zero-carbon economy by 2050, the 
EU must substantially raise its investment in energy systems and related infrastructure. 
Supported by investments in green technologies, sustainable solutions and new businesses, the 
European Green Deal can be a new growth strategy for the EU as a whole. Beyond the objective 
of restoring the health of the planet, it is a push to improve the quality of life of European 
citizens, and a way to unlock a range of new economic and business opportunities for all.  
Involvement and commitment of all EU member states is crucial to its success. It should also be 
understood that the path towards carbon neutrality needs to be based on solidarity between 
the countries and regions of the EU, and this solidarity has to ensure that there will be no one 
left behind. 
While the CESEE countries have improved their carbon footprint over the last decades, there is 
still a lot of room for improvement. The economic transformation of the region was 
accompanied by large-scale gains in energy efficiency over the past three decades but CESEE 
countries are still more energy intensive than the rest of the EU (Figure 10). On average, it takes 
about two times more energy to produce one unit of GDP in the CESEE, with severe implications 
not only on the carbon footprint, but also on air quality and health. At the same time, the still 
high levels of energy intensity suggest that large-scale industrial transformation will be required 
over the coming years. 
Figure 10: Energy intensity measured as total 
energy consumption relative to GDP (kgoe per 
EUR 1 000, 2018) 
Figure 11: Perceived impact of climate change 
and related weather patterns on firms’ business 
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Climate change is becoming a focal issue at corporate level. According to the 2020 wave of the 
EIBIS survey, one-fifth of firms in the region report that climate change and the related changes 
in weather patterns has had a major impact on their business, which is slightly below the EU 
average of 23% (Figure 11). A further 38% of companies report minor impact. The share of 
concerned firms is the highest in the construction and infrastructure sectors. The countries with 
the highest share of firms reporting a major impact on their businesses, as a result of climate 
change, are Romania (26%), Poland (25%), Croatia (23%) and Estonia (23%). 
Over half of firms in CESEE countries - 56% - have already invested or plan to invest in the next 
three years in measures to tackle the impact of weather events and reduction in carbon 
emissions. This is somewhat  lower than the EU average  of 67% (Figure 12). About 41% of CESEE 
firms did already invest into energy efficiency in the past, and they dedicated about 10 % of 
their total investment to such purposes in the last financial year (Figure 13). EIBIS data shows 
that while the share of firms that actually invested into greening is lower than the EU average 
(47%), the share of investment to improve energy efficiency in CESEE is in line with the EU (also 
around 10 %). However, there are some differences within the region with firms in Bulgaria and 
Slovakia dedicating more than 15% to energy efficiency improvements compared to less than 
10% in Estonia, Lithuania and Poland (see figure 9). The companies in the region find that the 
most important barriers to investment into tackling climate change are the uncertainty about 
the regulatory and tax environment, and the cost of green investment activities. 
Beyond investment, firms can also tackle the climate challenge through setting up internal 
procedures. According to the EIBIS, companies in CESEE countries are as likely as EU firms to 
have set internal targets on carbon and energy (40% and 41% respectively), but are less likely 
to have designated a person to develop their climate change strategies, 13% and 23% 
Figure 12: Share of firms with investment plans to 
tackle climate change impact 
Figure 13: Share of investment dedicated to energy 
efficiency improvements at firm level 
 
 
Source: EIBIS 2020 Source: EIBIS 2020 
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respectively (Figure 14). More than half of all firms across the CESEE region (53%) have had an 
energy audit in the past four years, similar to the EU average (55%). 
Figure 14:  Share of firms with energy targets, designated climate manager and energy audit 
 
Source: EIBIS 2020 
One particular area with sizable yet still untapped opportunities for large-scale energy efficiency 
improvement in the CESEE region is the energy use of the building stock.18 On the corporate 
side, this is corroborated by EIBIS data, as the share of firms stating that their building stock 
meets high energy efficiency standards remains below the EU average (29 % in CESEE compared 
to 37 % for the EU, EIBIS 2019). This indicates some room for improvement as well as corporate 
investment needs in this field (see Figure 15). 
                                               
18 For further discussion on financing energy efficiency and renovation in the region also see European Commission 
(2018). A detailed analysis and a set of policy proposals has been put forward in a report by the Prince of Wales 
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 Figure 15: Average share of building stock 
meeting high energy efficiency standards 
Figure 16: The share of households in final energy 
consumption in CESEE (2018) 
  
Source: EIBIS 2019 Source: Eurostat 



























Refurbishing buildings could reduce carbon emissions and improve the quality of life for citizens 
at the same time. Looking beyond firms, households account for 25-35 % of final energy use in 
the CESEE (Figure 16), and almost three-quarter of that energy is used for heating. At the same 
time, many households in the region are not able to adequately heat their homes at affordable 
prices, thus low-cost energy efficiency measures provide an opportunity to assist vulnerable 
households beyond the reduction in carbon impact. A large portion of the housing stock in 
CESEE is poorly insulated. However, given that the high share of the building stock was built 
using industrial prefabricated technology, in many cases standardised solutions could be rolled 
out at relative low costs. 
More financing, and more innovative financing support, is crucial to tap the large potential 
energy saving in the CESEE residential sector. While subsidised financing for energy efficiency 
improvements have been available in the past years from both EU and domestic sources, 
renovation rates remain below the EU average. This is partly due to structural factors – high 
individual ownership, low number of social rental housing, abundance of multi-unit residential 
buildings – that hinders decision-making on energy efficiency investments. The financial 
solutions offered need to be tailor-made to address these challenges. For instance, on-bill 
financing – where the repayments of loans for energy-efficient renovations are carried out 
through the utility bills – has large untapped potentials in CESEE, and could allow those 
households that otherwise have limited affiliation to the banking system to use external 
financing to improve their carbon footprint and comfort (Mundaca and Kloke, 2018). 
Electricity generation is another area where the carbon footprint can be reduced significantly. 
Many countries in the CESEE region continue to rely heavily on fossil fuels – coal in particular – 
to produce electricity (Figure 17). Significant new renewable capacity will need to be installed in 
all CESEE countries in order to meet the EU target of at least 32 per cent of renewable energy 
by 2030. 
CESEE countries have opportunities for renewable generation but differentiated strategies are 
needed. The rapid development of the technology and market for renewable energy generation 
– both globally and at the EU level – in the last 10 years provide practical and economical options 
to the CESEE region to revamp their models of electricity production. There is substantial 
heterogeneity in the viable opportunities for renewable energy generation across countries, 
depending on the geographical conditions. For Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, the yearly 
potential sum of electricity generation from a 1 kW photovoltaic solar configuration is 
approximately 1.5 times greater than that of Western Europe due to the higher amount of 
sunlight. In Poland and the Czech Republic, wind power potential is significant, as well as in 
highland areas in Romania and Bulgaria, which is far from being fully exploited. Geothermal 
energy production has significant potentials in some of the CESEE countries, in Hungary for 
instance. 
To unlock the potentials of renewable energy generation in CESEE, remaining obstacles need 
to be addressed. First, significant parts of the existing electricity networks need to be upgraded 
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to make them capable to accommodate the intermittent nature of renewable energy 
generation. Second, uncertainties of the policy frameworks governing renewable energy 
production and the related support schemes should be tackled. Finally, the labour market 
implications stemming from the energy transition – severe job losses in the mining industry in 
particular – should be handled through active policy measures such as dedicated retraining 
strategies. This can be facilitated for example by identifying local jobs similar in task content, 
offering suitable retraining options to acquire “bridging” skills and foster cooperation among 
stakeholders including employers, public authorities and educational institutions. 
Transportation is another high impact area CESEE countries can effectively address with 
integrated planning strategies. Transport uses about one-third of final energy consumption in 
the CESEE. Moreover, its share within energy use has grown significantly over the last decades 
(see Figure 18). Countries in the region have efficient and extensive public transportation 
systems relative to the rest of the EU as a legacy from the pre-1990 era. This pre-existing 
network, and the tradition of using public transport could form a solid basis for innovative 
mobility services in the future. Improving mass transit through efficient investments into the 
infrastructure and combining it with innovative services that incorporate shared solutions and 
smart mobility could provide a viable alternative to private car ownership. Moreover, 
improvements in transportation systems as part of integrated urban planning strategies can 
make a contribution to climate impact and improve citizens’ lives in the region. 
Electrification of the individual transport fleet together with the upscaling of community 
transport systems should be prioritised. Regulatory frameworks, subsidy schemes and 
innovative financing solutions need to be designed to support the uptake of electric vehicles, 
Figure 17: Share of fossil fuel in electricity 
generation in CEESE countries (% of total 
electricity, 2018) 
Figure 18: The share of transport in final energy 
consumption in CEE in 1990 and in 2018 (%) 
  













































































































which are restricted by lower purchasing power in CESEE countries. In the absence of such 
measures, there is an increased risk that demand for mobility in the region will be satisfied 
through import of used vehicles with high carbon footprint from other EU countries. 
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Skills and human capital 
 
The labour force has become a key constraint to investment and growth in CESEE in recent 
years. Labour markets have increasingly tightened, reflected in low unemployment and high job 
vacancy rates (Figure 19). This has resulted in wage increases well above the EU average (Figure 
20): wage growth developments have outpaced productivity growth in a number of most 
countries, potentially lowering competitiveness (EIB 2018, European Commission 2019).19 
Firms have been facing increasing difficulties in finding personnel, with innovative companies 
and those catching up to the productivity frontier often particularly affected. Labour shortages 
in the region are broad-based across different skill levels with wage increases similar or 
sometimes even higher in some low-skilled occupations.20 At the start of 2020, aggregate 
vacancies were higher and unemployment lower than before the financial crisis. Lack of staff 
with the right skills has posed a persistent impediment to investment for firms in the region 
                                               
19 Real wage growth exceeded productivity growth 2016-2018 particularly in Romania (almost 6pps on average) 
followed by Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia (about 2pps or more). See European 
Commission (2019) for further discussion. 
20 In some cases, these also reflect changes in the minimum wage. 
Figure 19: The Beveridge curve for the CEE Figure 20: Average annual growth (in %) in labour 
costs (2017-2019). 
 
   
Source: Eurostat Source: Eurostat 
Note: The labour cost index (LCI) shows the short-
term development of the labour cost, the total cost 













































throughout the last four years as indicated by EIBIS and remains a key concern for firms in the 
region with 76% reporting it as a barrier in 2020 (EU: 73%, EIB 2020). Firms have reported 
difficulties to fill open positions at higher-level occupations, for which 16% of firms report having 
long-term vacancies (see EIB 2018 for discussion). Beyond limiting production on the short run, 
these shortages can also add to difficulties to adopt new technologies and push technology 
investment to be more labour-saving than labour-augmenting (see section on digitalisation). 
Hence, the shortages can have negative implications for inclusiveness and potentially curb 
longer-term growth prospects.  
Figure 21: Share of firms reporting skill constraints (%), by productivity performance and country group 
 
Source: EIBIS 2016-2018, Orbis. 
Note: Categories refer to the dynamics in firms’ productivity performance for three country groups in the EU 
(CE=Central and Eastern Europe, WN=Western and North Western Europe, SE=Southern Europe). They 
dynamics are attributed to firms based on total factor productivity data available from 2011 to 2016. Productivity 
leaders are in the top quintiles of productivity levels by year in all observations. Firms catching up to the frontier 
started elsewhere in the distribution but arrived at the productivity frontier. Firms in the third category improved 
their ranking during the period of observation. Firms in the fourth category are stable (i.e. their last ranking is 
equal to the first). The firms in the fifth category worsened their position and those in the last position are stable 
at the bottom over the observation period.  
Reasons behind the skill shortages in CESEE are both cyclical and structural.21 Structurally, 
emigration and aging have exacerbated gaps (Batsaikhan et al., 2018, Atoyan et al., 2016). 
Analyses have pointed out the persistently higher levels of emigration over the last decades, 
particularly of the higher skilled and accelerating after EU accession. We found reporting of skill 
shortages by firms more pronounced in the countries more strongly affected by brain drain (EIB 
                                               



















































































































































































































































2018). Cyclically, the fast and strong rebound after the financial crisis increased labour demand. 
At the same time, sectoral shifts within CESEE economies - higher job creation in high 
technology intensive activities and job losses in some traditional activities such as agriculture, 
mining etc. – contributed to shortages as required skillsets are less readily available. 
Altogether, the labour market situation contrasts with the period from the mid-1990’s to the 
early 2000. In the past, an abundant labour force with relatively high education levels and good 
potential for requalification rendered CESEE countries attractive for near-shoring activities, 
supported integration into global value chains and economic growth. Over recent years, skill 
shortages have more become more prevalent often limiting firms’. Analysis of EIBIS data  
suggests that innovative firms in the region appear particularly subject to skill constraints. This 
can negatively affect the potential of CESEE firms when it comes to boosting their innovation 
activity. Moreover, firms striving to catch up to the productivity frontier are more likely to report 
gaps (see Figure 21). 
Unused or underused reserves of labour still exist in most CESEE countries but require support 
for activation. Policy actions would be necessary to access these reserves. For instance, 
unemployment and inactivity have remained high in many rural regions over the last years, but 
the large mismatch in skills often prevent the affected population from engaging in the labour 
market. Previously relocated low-value added FDI, such as white products assembly, could give 
way to higher value added facilities by leaving and freeing up labour. Furthermore, the public 
sector employs a significant part of the highly skilled labour force, therefore improving the 
efficiency of the state could also help alleviating labour shortage in the private sector. Moreover, 
a better alignment of education systems with labour market needs can help to mitigate skill 
shortages and prevent inactivity. 
Investment in human capital is needed to prepare the workforce for changes and avoid 
deepening of socio-economic divergences. Job automation risks in CESEE economies tend to 
be higher than across Western Europe.  At the same time, lifelong learning participation of the 
workforce lags. As for firm training, EIBIS data shows that in CESEE, it is particularly in regions 
where a relatively high share of jobs are at risk that fewer firms invest in training of their 
workforce (EIB 2020). Notably, CESEE contrasts with other parts of Europe where firms’ 
propensity of investing in training either does not differ by automation risks – the case in North 
and Western Europe – or relatively more firms invest in training where risks of job losses linked 
to automation are elevated (Southern Europe). In contrast, the pattern for CESEE points to 
potential difficulties in managing the digital transition in an inclusive manner, as possibilities for 
training and retraining are essential for the workforce to obtain and remain in quality 
employment as digitalisation advances.       
Increasing access to training and learning opportunities remains key for the region to support 
further convergence. An innovation-based and sustainable growth model can only be 
implemented successfully if the structures that develop and nurture the necessary skills of 
employees are in place. Skills are the basis underpinning development of innovation in the 
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region, in turn helping to advance digitalisation and the transition towards a greener economy. 
At the same time, the skill base and continuous investment in upgrading it mitigates risks of 
large-scale job losses due to digitalisation and facilitates adaptation processes related to the 
transition towards a carbon-neutral economy. 
Skills are key to support firms’ competitiveness and to strengthen inclusiveness in the region. 
Over the last 15 years, some positive developments are visible, as more firms have been 
investing in the training of their workforce (Figure 22). However, given the substantial 
transformative potential of digital technologies for labour markets together with industrial 
transformation linked to greening of the economy, more activity will be needed looking ahead. 
While analyses project a neutral or even positive impact on employment for the green transition, 
some job losses will be locally concentrated and hence require targeted efforts to support job 
transitions and develop new skillsets.  
CESEE countries need to step up efforts to boost adult learning. Nurturing skills and knowledge 
in CESEE requires comprehensive strategies, including enhanced possibilities for upskilling and 
reskilling during working lives. Currently, most CESEE countries lag behind the EU average on 
the share of people participating in life-long learning (Figure 23). Moreover, some countries 
show strong urban-rural disparities. For example, participation in lifelong learning remains 
below one percent in some more rural regions of Romania.  
CESEE is exposed to a double transition. The digital transformation, together with the 
decarbonisation are likely to put additional strains on the labour market. These risks are clearly 
present, as high automation risk is concentrated in the CESEE. When it comes to 
Figure 22:  Share of firms providing training (in % 
of all enterprises), by EU country groups 
Figure 23: Share of the adult population 
participating in lifelong learning in 2019 
  
Source: Eurostat, CVTS. 
Note: Group averages exclude Croatia and Ireland 
due to missing data for 2005-2010. 
Source: Eurostat. 
Note:  Participation rate in education and training 























decarbonisation, the key risk stems from the fact that significant proportions of the population 
are employed by the coal industry in some CESEE countries, such as in Poland, Czechia, Romania 
and Bulgaria. These transition risks need to be addressed promptly to avoid outcomes where 
significant parts of the populations become excluded from the gains of the progress.  Policies 
need to be put in place to avoid high rates of technological unemployment, and prevent further 
polarisation on EU labour markets. Currently, spending on active labour market policies in most 
countries in the region is low in comparison (EIB 2018). Retraining and support will be required 
to ensure new economic opportunities for the workers who will lose their jobs. Public policies 
focused on skills are central to provide the workforce with the right skills to complement new 
technologies and thus mitigate labour market polarisation. However, providing skills through 
re-training is only one side of the coin: financial support also needs to support job creation in 
the affected regions, and pathways should be created to match the demand with supply. 
Stepping up adult learning needs to be combined with efforts to strengthen quality and 
inclusiveness in education. Locally concentrated job losses, e.g. due to mining or plant closures 
call for local retraining efforts and strategies to boost adult learning. Moreover, education 
systems are central to equip people with the skillsets to adapt successfully to changing job 
requirements throughout their working lives. Performance of education systems vary across the 
region but several countries compare favourably in standardised student performance 
measurement particularly for mathematics and sciences (OECD PISA 2018 results, OECD 
education at a glance).22 Also, the gap to EU digitalisation frontrunners in the availability of ICT 
specialists seems to narrow for the younger population, suggesting that graduates increasingly 
pick up much needed skillsets (Novak et al 2018). However, curricula and teaching methods 
need to be progressively adapted to ensure the development of skills complementary to new 
digital technologies. Beyond technical skillsets such as programming, this also means 
strengthening the focus on communication, creativity, critical thinking and leadership skills in 
education. Also, policies that foster inclusiveness in education are needed to mitigate risks of 
long-lasting detachment from the labour market early on.   
Digital technologies need to be leveraged better to boost learning in the region. A changing 
labour market will require more flexibility from education systems. This requires constant review 
of curricula and studies and collaboration between educational institutions and firms to improve 
labour market relevance of offers. In some cases, this can mean shorter periods of study, 
potentially combined with work, or new degrees offered by educational institutions. In addition, 
digital technology could be leveraged for education, with online tools having the potential to 
boost learning on a broader scale.   
                                               
22 Based on 2018 PISA results for pupils’ performance in mathematics, science and reading, Estonia ranks best among 
EU peers and compares favorably globally. For mathematics and sciences, Poland, Slovenia and Czechia score above 
OECD average. 
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The COVID-19 shock: What implications for moving 
towards a new growth model in CESEE? 
 
The COVID-19 shock reinforces the need for a new growth model. The need for a new growth 
model in CESEE is primarily driven by structural trends (including technological change, 
demographics) rather than cyclical fluctuations. Nevertheless, the global pandemic shock 
induced by COVID-19 also affects the CESEE countries significantly. We assess the short-to 
medium impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the region and discuss implications for 
transitioning towards a new growth model.  
The COVID-19 pandemic constitutes an unprecedented economic shock for the CESEE region 
and ends the upswing abruptly. Countries in the region have enacted early and strict lockdown 
measures in European comparison, which helped to contain the spread of the virus and mitigate 
costs to human lives. Nevertheless, most countries in CESEE are now facing the strongest 
economic contraction since the 1990s. 
Source: Shippeo. 
Note: Index based on live operation status data for more than 3000 plants and warehouses in Europe and 
thousands of associated transportation flows. 
The pandemic is also amplifying some of the structural challenges that the CESEE economies 
are facing. For instance, it clearly demonstrated the critical importance of digitalisation for 
competitiveness, and highlighted the risks of lagging behind in these areas. The experience of 
the lockdown gave further impetus to the adoption of new digital and green technologies, in 
contrast to traditional industries such as manufacturing where the firms involved in EU supply 
chains have stronger competitive positions. Digital firms also showed that they are much more 
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resilient to lockdown of physical borders than traditional industries and services. As to the labour 
market and skills, COVID further widened the gap between the “old” and the “new” world of 
work. This risks a widening of the already existing regional and societal fault lines.23 
The impact of the pandemic shock on CESEE economies is heterogeneous, depending on 
structural features. Dependencies on sectors particularly sensitive to lockdown measures and 
external linkages mean higher risks and negative implications for countries’ growth outlook 
2020. When asked about the long-term impact of COVID-19 as part of the EIBIS, firms in the 
CESEE region highlight more – relative to the EU average - the impact on their supply chains 
(42% versus 36%). Integration into global value chains is a key channel with particularly strong 
impacts in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, which are strongly exposed to the German 
automotive supply chain, which suffered a particularly harsh disruption due to the first-wave 
lockdown measures in spring (Figure 24). Other countries, such as Croatia and Slovenia have a 
particularly strong role of tourism in the economy. As such, Croatia, with the highest share of 
tourism in GDP (23%) in the region, is also among the hardest hit. Poland stands to be relatively 
less affected given stronger domestic orientation of the economy (Figure 25). 
 
Source: EU Commission/AMECO, Autumn 2020 forecast. 
One shared feature across the region is a relatively high vulnerability to capital outflows 
experience. This channel amplified the effects of the 2008 crisis significantly in the region. 
However, most CESEE economies are better positioned now to weather external shocks than 
they used to be in 2008. This is reflected in lower levels of public debt, lesser reliance on short-
term capital flows and more balanced loan to deposit ratios on the banks’ side. As a result, while 
portfolio outflows from CESEE countries were significant at the start of the outbreak, they have 
rapidly stabilised, and the impact on exchange rates was significant, yet containable so far. 
                                               
23 Darvas (2020) points out that within the EU, about 8% of employees with basic secondary education or lower lost 













































































































Figure 25: Predicted changes in GDP across EU member states for 2020 
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The banking sector entered this crisis more solidly. Most recent survey evidence suggest that 
the banking sector is facing one of the worst years since the financial crisis (EIB 2020a). NPLs 
have started increasing again, albeit less rapidly than expected at the onset of the pandemic. 
On the upside though, the banking sector is in a stronger position than before the financial 
crisis. NPLs have come down over the last years and banks’ capitalization has been shored up 
(Figure 26). In addition, regulatory and policy measures have helped to support lending mitigate 
the immediate impact of the pandemic on the banking sector (see Figure 27).  
Figure 26: CESEE banks core tier 1 ratio, per cent 
risk weighted assets 
Figure 27: CESEE banks’ view on the usefulness of 
various regulatory measures 
  
Source: IMF Source: EIB CESEE Bank Lending Survey 
Note: Survey question: “Did the following 
regulatory and policy measures help to 
support/maintain lending to the economy?” 
 
CESEE countries’ labour markets short-term and structural challenges linked to COVID-19. 
Increases in unemployment are projected above EU averages in most CESEE countries (see 
Figure 28). This reflects structural and institutional features of labour markets including higher 
shares of self-employed and temporary contracts, employment protection legislation and 
limited employee bargaining power. While CESEE countries have a less strong tradition of short-
time work schemes compared to other continental labour markets such as Germany or Austria, 
the use of furlough or short has broadened across the region and helped to mitigate the 
immediate rise in unemployment. At the same time, unemployment is projected to further 
increase in 2021 in most countries. Moreover, recent results of EIBIS indicate that 19% of firms 
in the region expect COVID 19 to lead to permanent reductions in employment. While 
unemployment benefit schemes vary within the CESEE with respect to duration and replacement 
rates, duration tends to be more limited in most (typically not exceeding 12 months; Astrov, 
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Holzner et al, 2019). Also, benefits tend to be more favourably to older employees while younger 
workers typically face a higher risk of unemployment as a result of the shock i.a. due to contract 
situations and employment in sectors particularly hard hit. In addition, a number of CESEE 
countries have relatively high shares of self-employed (Poland, Romania, Czechia), typically with 
little protection if their businesses falter as a result of shocks. Hence, a swift restart of the 
economy is paramount to limit the social impact from economic contraction induced by the 
pandemic in CESEE.  
When it comes to climate change mitigation, the COVID-19 pandemic opened a window of 
opportunity to break with old bad habits. The lockdowns implemented across the world have 
led to sharp drops in carbon emissions in the short run. Although this is likely to have only 
negligible impact on climate change in the long run, the experience has pointed the way 
towards changes that could reduce emissions in the longer-term.  For instance, we have now a 
new baseline of what can be achieved digitally: remote work, education, shopping. The 
pandemic therefore offers a “make-or-break” moment for the fight climate change. If CESEE 
countries miss that, they risk fully reverting to the pre-pandemic standards and locking them in 
for longer. 
 
Source: EU Commission (Autumn forecast). 
A strong impact on in investment is expected. The effect of the pandemic on private investment 
in the CESEE region stands to be pronounced, with drops ranging above 10 percent (see Figure 
29). Romania, where investment activity had been volatile over the last years, is the only EU 
country in the EU where still an increase investment is expected, supported by construction. The 
drop in private capital formation is only marginally compensated by government investment. 
At the same time, the global pandemic adds to already high levels of uncertainty that have 
prevailed in the region and posed limits to corporate investments (EIBIS 2019, 2020 and 
forthcoming). On the corporate side, the heightened uncertainty leads firms to postpone and/or 
rescale their plans. This effect tends to be stronger during recessions as lower cash flows 
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Figure 28: Predicted changes in unemployment across CESEE and EU 2020/21 
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intensive firms tend to react less negatively to uncertainty. For CESEE, new data from EIBIS shows 
that about 44% of CESEE firms say they expect to invest less in 2020 due to the pandemic. 
Among firms with investment plans, three in ten report to delay or abandon (part of) these (see 
Figure 29). Around one quarter (24%) expects to continue investment plans with a reduced 
scale. While CESEE firms’ investment reaction are about in line with other EU peers, the planned 
reduction coincide with persistently higher shares of firms having reported investment gaps 
over the last years and still continue doing so (21% in CESEE compared to 15% in the EU). In 
particular, firms in Romania (33%) and Lithuania (31%) are most likely to think they had invested 
too little. Against this background, the COVID-related cuts could further delay catching up 
processes and improvements in the capital stock. Similarly, recent analysis finds that CESEE 
continues to have massive gaps in infrastructure investment compared to Western Europe (IMF 
2020). Overall, the decline in aggregate investment is expected to be substantial, and risks 
delaying convergence. 
The crisis prompted swift and strong policy responses to support firms and households helped 
to mitigate negative effects. Immediate economic policy responses in the region to the COVID 
shock have relied on a mix of monetary and fiscal policy measures to provide support for firms 
and households (see table 2 for an overview for measures during the first wave). Policymakers 
have acted, pledging support and stepping up measures to support corporates as 
developments unfolded. Policy responses by national governments including fiscal stimulus and 
Figure 29:  Forecasted change in public and 
private investment, volume (percentage 
change on preceding year) 
Figure 30: Impact of COVID-19 on firms’ investment 
plans (Have your company’s overall investment 
expectations for 2020 changed due to coronavirus?) 
 
  
Source: European Commission (AMECO), Autumn 
forecast. 
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liquidity support such as guarantees. Boosting access to (emergency) loans is clearly among the 
most popular responses to mitigate the impact of the COVID shock on corporates and the wider 
economy in CESEE and across the EU. Furthermore, all countries have implemented some form 
of tax forbearance as part of their policy response measures.24 The use of debt moratoria in some 
form has been relatively common across the region. While the uptake somewhat varies across 
countries in the region, some 25-30% of banks report that moratoria have equaled 10-20% of 
their outstanding portfolios for household and corporate loans (see EIB 2020a for further 
discussion). Similarly, the large majority of governments have implemented some form of wage 
subsidies, for instance using some form of short-time work or furlough schemes to maintain 
employment and support corporate liquidity.  
The national policy measures are being complemented through EU support. Notably this 
includes two new dedicated instruments, i.e. the SURE scheme (European Instrument for 
temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment risks in an Emergence) to provide financial 
assistance in the form of loans to member states to support short-term work and similar 
measures and the new pan-European guarantee fund to support corporates. The pan-European 
guarantee fund also helps to preserve a level playing field in the single market, given that 
member states responses have differed in size of stimulus and implementation speed. Under 
SURE, ten CESEE countries have received financial support amounting to EUR 21.7 bn.25 
Table 2: Short-term COVID policy responses with a focus on corporates and households – 1st wave 
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SI              
Source: OECD, IMF, EIB ECON. As of June 2020. 
                                               
24 Based on IHS, IMF and OECD policy response information.  
25 The countries are Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
See European Commission, Dec. 2020.   
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Following on swift policy responses, forward-looking strategies for recovery are needed. Policy 
support to firms and households has been crucial amidst the onset of the pandemic in spring 
to address urgent liquidity needs, enforce health sector capacity and to mitigate immediate 
social hardships. Similarly, it will be key for the recovery phase. Recovery strategies should focus 
on the four elements of the new growth model – innovation, digitalisation, the green transition 
and a focus on human capital to support a forceful and sustainable economic rebound. Not 
addressing those, raises risks to longer-term competitiveness and inclusiveness of CESEE 
economies. The preparation of national recovery plans to set out key public investment projects 
and reforms aims to reinforce efforts to develop growth strategies to support sustainable and 
inclusive growth looking ahead. 
The common European framework and support for recovery can benefit countries’ strategies. 
When formulating policy options for the building blocks of the new engine for the region, it is 
useful to consider the broader – in this case European – context. The EU at large is facing its 
structural challenges: the urging necessity of the transition towards a carbon-neutral economy, 
the need to embrace digitalisation and the fourth industrial revolution, and the call for more 
inclusive growth. The EU agenda that addresses these challenges provides an opportunity for 
CESEE countries to fit their economic transformation into the broader EU-level policy 
framework, exploiting synergies, funding opportunities and more. The recovery support from 
the European side, also envisages improved support possibilities as part of the next generation 
EU package, such as a reinforcement of the Just transition fund instrument and enhanced 
financing support for green and digital projects, which provide support for CESEE economies’ 
to transition successfully towards a new growth model.26 Action would focus on unlocking the 
job creation potential of the digital and green transition, for instance through investment in 
clean technologies and increasing energy efficiency of buildings, but also support foster 
reskilling and upskilling activities to better equip the workforce with the skills needed in a 
changing labour market. 
  
                                               
26 On the next generation EU package also see European Commission (27 May 2020) 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_940 
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Conclusions and policy recommendations 
 
Countries in the CESEE region need to revisit their economic models to continue the process of 
economic convergence. The conditions on which the pre-crisis dynamics of these economies 
was founded have changed, and they need a “new growth model” to drive economic 
convergence looking ahead. This new growth model should focus on home-grown innovation, 
knowledge and skills-based growth, and sustainability, leveraging the opportunities of digital 
technologies. 
The COVID-19 shock amplifies the structural challenges CESEE economies are facing. The 
experience of the lockdown demonstrated the critical importance of digitalisation for 
competitiveness and economic resilience and highlighted the costs of lagging behind in this 
area. Moreover, it showed that different, more sustainable ways of production and work are 
possible. At the same time, the pandemic shock risks a widening of inequalities and societal 
fault lines in the region, if the economic impact of the pandemic are not adequately addressed 
and countries in the region are too slow to adapt swiftly to the structural transformation 
processes the shock emphasized. 
Jointly strengthening the four elements of the new growth model brings benefits for economies 
and citizens of CESEE. Domestic innovation, digitalisation, sustainable development and 
strengthening skills are closely intertwined. While innovation is increasingly digital, the 
technologies (to be) developed power a successful green transition. Skills form the basis to drive 
these processes and enable individuals to seize the opportunities of economic transformation. 
Comprehensive efforts are needed to boost home-grown innovation across the region. As a 
group, CESEE economies are still lagging behind the rest of the EU and currently, innovation is 
happening mostly in large, foreign-owned manufacturing firms.  
• To translate research into tangible innovation, a broader set of private firms need to 
invest into intangible assets, particularly into R&D. The key challenge remains to reduce 
the share of firms neither actively advancing nor adopting innovation. This supports 
rising productivity on average as well as mitigating gaps across firms.  
• Part of the innovation gap is related to finance, or the lack of it. As a consequence, 
fostering capital market development and increasing the set of capital providers that are 
able to finance and support innovative companies through their activities and suitable 
financial products is key to support the innovation process. This includes better access 
to growth and risk capital, new venture debt products and alternative funding sources.  
• Furthermore, a key obstacle innovative firms, new digital entrepreneurs and start-ups 
are facing is related to skill bottlenecks. Strengthening of the skill base through 
investment in education systems and life-long learning opportunities is therefore also 
necessary to advance the transition towards a knowledge economy. 
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Digitalisation also calls for investment into skills and human capital across the region. 
Digitalisation can alleviate labour shortages and contribute to innovation as an enabling factor. 
However, if not matched with the necessary policy measures, it can add to the strains of the 
labour market by increasing skill mismatches, substituting human workplaces by technology 
and adding to social polarisation. The combination of a favourable business environment and 
availability of digital talent is the basis to broaden adoption and foster digital innovation in the 
region.  
• Policy support for digitalisation in CESEE needs to come with a strong focus on human 
capital. To support the availability of digital skills, both education and life-long learning 
systems in CESEE need to be strengthened. The focus on digital skills needs to become 
“engrained” and the acquisition of human-centric skills complementary to technologies. 
• The development of basic digital skills are particularly important in determining the 
overall labour market impact of digitalisation as constraints in basic digital skills can skew 
firms’ investment in digital technologies towards the labour saving type. 
• Policies focused on businesses should foster access to early stage funding and the 
creation of accelerators and incubators. Governments also need to work with local 
stakeholders to ensure that the right incentives and supporting tools are available to 
strengthen digital ecosystems. 
The transition towards carbon-neutrality brings new opportunities to the economies of the 
region.  As part of the EU agenda to achieve a net zero-carbon economy by 2050, the CESEE 
region is also in the process of shifting its energy systems and related infrastructure towards 
sustainability. Given the high energy intensity of the CESEE economies, the path ahead is not 
going to be without challenges. The transformation towards carbon neutrality is bound to 
unlock a range of new economic and business opportunities, for example for the production of 
renewable energies. Given the legacy of the region, strong policy action is necessary to drive 
the transition itself, but also to mitigate of the possible adverse social impacts of the low carbon 
transformation to ensure that there will be no one left behind. However, there are also ‘low 
hanging fruits’. 
• Refurbishing buildings (both residential and non-residential) could reduce carbon 
emissions and improve the quality of life for citizens at the same time. More financing, 
and more innovative financing support, is crucial to tap the large potential energy saving 
in the CESEE residential sector. 
• Tapping the region’s unlocked opportunities in renewable electricity generation is 
another area where the carbon footprint can be reduced significantly. Differentiated 
strategies are needed to reflect the country-specific and regional geographical 
conditions. 
• Transportation is another high impact area CESEE countries could effectively address 
with integrated planning strategies, by upgrading the quality of the pre-existing 
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extensive public transportation systems, and supporting the accelerated electrification 
of the individual transport fleet. 
Labour markets risk remaining a major bottleneck for long-term growth if challenges remain 
unaddressed. Active labour market policies can help ease labour market shortages by improving 
job matching and bringing parts of the inactive population in the labour market. Moreover, they 
can help to build increase the availability of much-needed skillsets through support for re- and 
upskilling. While labour market shortages may temporarily ease due to the impact of the COVID 
shock, structural drivers such as adverse demographics and pressure from emigration suggest 
that they are likely to return sooner rather than later. Policies focusing on skills of the workforce 
promise the benefits of easing adaptation to changing skills requirements and improving 
longer-term competitiveness. To that extent, skill policies are also going to influence CESEE 
countries positioning in (re)structured value chains in a post-COVID world. 
• CESEE countries need to step up efforts to boost adult learning to deal with the strains 
digitalisation and decarbonisation are putting on the labour market.  
• In addition, financial support also needs to support job creation in the regions that are 
affected negatively by the green and digital transitions, and pathways should be created 
to match the demand with supply. 
• Stepping up adult learning needs to be combined with efforts to strengthen quality and 
inclusiveness in education. Beyond technical skillsets, strengthening the focus on 
communication, creativity, critical thinking and leadership skills should be prioritised, 
together with  policies that foster inclusiveness to mitigate risks of early detachment 
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